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West Papuan refugees moved away 
from Blackwater camp 
On 2 May, the Papua New Guinea authorities began to 
airlift West Pap.an rnfugees out of Blackwater camp near 
Vanimo in an operation designed to empty the camp as 
fast as pa;sible. The refugees were all transferred to 
Kiunga in Western Prov:irx:e for re-location to East Aw in, 
the only area where re-locatiai camps have been set up 
for refugees who have flooded into Papua New Guinea 
since February 1984. 
The evacuation of Blackwater followed a preposterous 
claim by the Indcnesians that the Blackwater refugees 
were responsible for an attack on a transmigration site 
in West Papua on 11 March (see separate item). The 
evacuatial Wa9 cani.edout by a two-hundred-man squad of 
P NG EX>l.ioamen and P NG Defence Force troops, w 1th police 
dogs. In a highly charged atmosphere, the refugees were 
told to register for re-location and had little option 
but to comply. Within the limits of itS remit, the UN 
High Commission fbr Refu~es (UNHCR) could cb little 
more than urge the PNG auth:>rities mt to use violence. 
By 15 May, about eight hundred refugees had been 
removed, leaving a groop of ten who refused to move. It 
was not clear at the time of going to press what would 
happen to them. 
143 refugees from Biak who left Blackwater camp some 
timea;oandsetthemselves up nearby in Wara Stone were 
apparently not included at this stage of the evacuation. 
PNG politician Warren Dutton, the Justice Minister in 
the first Paias w ingti cpvernment, has oondemned the re-
location of Blackwater refugees to East A win, believing 
that it was taken under strong Indonesian pressure to 
remove active OPM supporters from an area close to 
Jayapura and the scene of intense OPM activity. 
The evacuation took pla:=e despite representations last 
year by Black.water refugees not to be moved to East 
Awin. In a declaration in March 1987, Blackwater camp 
refugees rejected the idea going to an inland site. They 
are coastal people who would find it diffirult to 
integrate with inlaoo people. 
Crisis on PNG-Indonesian border 
Following the 11 March attac:X on a transmigration site 
when five hostages were taken, OPM guerrillas took their 
host.ages to OPM camps close to the border where they 
were trailed by!ndonesian troops. On 3 and 4 April, the 
troq:>s raided the camps, one of which was one kilometre 
inside PNG territory. This led to a strong protest from 
Pap.la New Guirea's Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi who told 
the Incbnesian ambassador that such an incursion in 
pursuit of the OPM was intolerable. The PNG Defence 
Department alro anrnm:m that troops of the P NG Defence 
Force had succeeded in freeing three of the ha;tages 
while the other two appear to have been killed during 
the assault. [ Post Courier, 14 and 22 April 1988) 
According to several sources, Australian officials 
also became involved at the border. This could have 
happened urrler the terms of the Joint Declaration of 
Principles adcpted by PNG and Australia earlier this 
year, formalising Australia's defence oommitment to 
Papua New Guinea. It provides that in the case of 
external armed attack, the two governments shall consult 
on measures to be taken, jointly or separately, in 
relation to the attack. According to one source, 
Indonesian troops were withdrawn from PNG territory 
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because of the Australian intervention. The sequence of 
events also suggests that the evacuation of Black.water 
camp was a condition of the Indonesian withdrawal. 
In 1986, the Wingti Government intended to create 
three re-location sites, cne in East A win to accommodate 
nm-politically active refugees in W estem Province, one 
in Lum~ West Sepik Province to acoommodate non-
politically active refugees in West Sepik Province am 
cne in Wabo, Gulf PI'O\Tince, strictly as a temporary camp 
for politically-active refugees until they are resettled 
elsewhereinPNG oroverseas [Timesaf Papua New Guinea, 
5-11 May 1988]. With East Awin the only area now 
available for refugees, there was nowhere else to serrl 
the Blackwater people. 
The roots of the crisis 
The roots of the crisis engulfing the refugees in 
Papm New Guinea go back several years. Initially, Port 
Moresby wanted to rid itself of the problem by 
repatrtating the vast majority of refugees1 a programme 
a fbroed repatriaticn began in 1985 when several groups 
were forced to reblm to Inoonesia. World protest halted 
this policy and led to the collapse of the Somare 
govemrnent:. The Wingti. government which then took office 
decided to accede to the UN Convention on Refugees and 
involved the UN H CR in finilng a solution. One aspect of 
the new policy was the re-location of refugees some 
distance from the boroer, along with political asylum 
for the more politically-active refugees in Papua New 
Guinea or overseas. 
But re-location had strong oppcnents especially in 
Canberra wh:!re it was feared that providing long-term 
acx:x:mmodatim for West Pap.ians in Pap.a New Guinea would 
entice tens or even hurrlred:; of thousarrls more to cross 
the border, a recognition of the dissatisfaction among 
West Papuans now living urrler Indonesian rule. So 
Australia withheld funds for re-location, insisting that 
the UNHCR shruld:insteadpersuade!rrlonesia to allow an 
international agency to monitor the reb.lrn of refugees. 
'!he assumption was that this would encourage refugees to 
go home vohmtarily. However, Jakarta refused all 
efforts either by the UNHCR or the International Red 
Cross (ICRC) to establish a presence in West Papua. In 
' 
' 
' 
'-
any case, there has never been any evidence that large-
scale voluntary repatriaticn was feasible, given the 
strong feelings among refugees towards Irrlonesia. 
Close ties between PNG and Indonesian armies 
While this was happening at the international level, 
Pap.ia New Gu:ireaarrlird::nesia were engaged in bilateral 
negotiations for a friendship treaty which was concluded 
in October 1986. Although Indonesia failed to get Papua 
New Guinea to agree to joint border patrols and the 
right of 'hot pursuit' for Indonesian troops trying to 
track down o PM guerrillas on P NG territory, Muroani 
worked wt a deal with Brigadier-General Anthony Huai, 
then ccmmamer of the PN G Defeooe Force (P NG D F), fbr co-
ordinated action to cmtrol security in the border 
region, especially during the re-location of refugees • 
Murdani's primary aim was to 'sanitise' the boroer 
region and ensure close collaboration between the 
Indcnesian armed forces and the P NG D F in border 
operations against the OPM, including the exchange of 
military attaches as the channel for military 
intelligence about the border region. The details were 
worked out during talks between Murdani and Huai in 
Jayapura in May 1986, a week before the regotiations in 
Jakarta to finalise the draft. of the Frierrlship Treaty. 
Clearly, Indonesia wanted to make sure that no camps 
remained aiywhere near the border, providing sancb.lary 
and support for the OPM. Moreover, following a visit to 
Jakarta in March 1986, Huai said P NG arrl Indonesia had 
reach:!d an urrlerstanding to pursue the common objective 
of eliminating the O PM wh:>m he described as "a bundl of 
terrorists" [Niugini Nius, 27 March 1986]. 
Blcckwatercrunphas alw~s been considered by Jakarta 
as the most dangerous camp because many political 
activists lived there, including deserters from the 
Irrlonesian army. The Indonesian army still smarts fran 
the humiliating blow struck by the Blackwater refugees 
in October 1984 when Irrlonesian officials headed by 
Brigadier-General Soegiyono, then deputy-governor of 
Irian Jaya, had to beat a hasty retreat because angry 
refugeesgreetroth:!m withahailaf missiles [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 66, November 1984]. According to refugees 
in Blackwater, Irrlonesian agents have since infiltrated 
the camp, placin.;J the refugees' security in jeopardy. 
Murdani's associates in the PNGDF 
The Murtlani-Huai. a:x::om has never been made public but 
the close links between present and past PNGDF 
oommarrers arrl Murdani. were exposed in 1987 when former 
PNGDF commarder, Ted Diro, admittedthath:! had accepted 
$139,400 from Murdani to finance his party's 1987 
election campaign. The money was premised in March 1987 
when Diro, then Foreign Minister, visited Jakarta to 
formalise the Friendship Treaty. Diro was fo:cced to 
resign as Foreign Minister and became a minister without 
portf"olio after coming under investigation for fraud. 
Wh:!nthe Murdanibribe became public, Diro resigned as 
minister but remains a force in P NG politics as leader 
of the People's Action Party, despite his highly 
compromising links with Murdani. 
Soon after Diro's resignation, Huai was sacked as 
P NG D F commander for making unauthorised visits to 
Jakarta, for receiving gifts from Murdani and for 
leaking details to him about the draft Joint Declaration 
of Prirciples between PN G ani Australia. Public disgrace 
has not meant the removal of the two Murdani associates 
from political life, nor has it meant a reversal of the 
undertakings Huai made to Murdani in May 1986. Soon 
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afterHuai'sdismissal, James Pokasui, the PNG Defence 
Minister, and Brigadier-General Rocky Lokinap, Huai's 
successor as PNGDF commander, visited Jakarta to 
reinforce ties between the two military establishments. 
Apart from tll:! secret deal on border seruricy, these 
ties include training facilities for senior P NG D F 
officers at the Indonesian army's staff and command 
scmol (Seskoad), training for lower ranks and the 
supply of military equipment to the PNGDF. "tr 
Renewed fighting in West Papua 
There are reports of renewed fighting in West Papua 
between the OPM and the Indonesian army. Acoording to 
reports in tie PNG press, heavy fighting was continuing 
in Sarmi sub-district, west of Jayapura, and in the 
highland sub-districts of P aniai and N abire [Post 
Couriel# 2 May]. OPM leader Mathias Wenda, regional 
commander in Jayapura, spoke of fighting in several 
places causing the deaths of more than 150 people. 
The heightened level of activities has been 
accompanied by widespread arrests. According to 
information from inside West Papua which reached the 
refu~es in Blackwater befure they were evacuated, many 
people who were held for varying periods in the past 
twency years have been re-arrested and subjected to 
interrogation and maltreatment. In the cities, the 
military pris:ns are over-crowded. The source mentions a 
number of kampungs where arrests have taken place: 
Depapre in Jayapura district, Dorrnena, wambena and 
Tablasupa in Tanah Merah, as well as Ormu I and II, 
Jongsu I and II, Japase, Tablanusu, Kendate, Demoi, 
Kantomilena, Wanya arrl Bugisi, the precise locations of 
which are not clear. 
There are also reports of more West Papuans fleeing 
across the border into Papua New Guinea. One group 
crossed over to Kanovai, a village on the Fly River 
between Bosset and Obo [ Post Courier, 11 April 1988). 
Another group of twenty-two people crossed over on 23 
April to Bewani, aboot 45 kms sooth-west of Vanirno. The 
adult males in this grrup are to be charged for illegal 
entry [Times of Papia New Guinea, 28 April - 4 May].Jvt 
WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES 
Refugees from Blackwater CCJTll> who hove now been 
transfer red t? East Awin. 
Trans1nigration site attacked in West Papua 
A group of aha.it Orio hundred people, most of them armed 
w:ith macretes, attacked the Ano IV transmigratim site, 
south-east of Lake Sentani at around 3 pm on 11 March. 
The attack proceeded withoot any armed cppositioo as no 
guards were on ducy at the time. 
The 100.cnesian authorities were not alerted of the 
attack until four hours later, when helicopters were 
sent to take out the wounded. One source reports that 
following the attack, five local transmigrants 
('transloks') were arrested; the casualties were also 
said to include local transmigrants [Indonesia News 
Service, No 94, 25 April 1988). According to the PNG 
media, many West Papuan civil servants and politicians 
were arrested in Jayapura following the raid and heavy 
fighting was continuing in Sarmi sub-district, west of 
Jayapura, and Paniai and Nabire sub-districts in the 
highlands [Post Cwrier, 2 May 1988). 
Reports of the attack have rom e from several sources. 
The first report which T APOL receiverl very soon after 
the attack, from a very reliable source, said that 
seventeen people were killed as the assailants went Cbwn 
the rows of houses hunting out transmigrants. The INS 
source reported twelve dead, with seventeen being 
treated in hospital and s.ix missing and thought to have 
been taken hostage. 
Much later, when reports began to appear in the PNG 
and Australian press, tle figures were vastly inflated. 
According to Australian Associated Press, at least two 
hurrlredpeople were killed. "According 1:t> OPM sources, 
152 Indonesians - both civilians and soldiers - were 
killed during the attack... and another fifty troops 
wounded, some of whom died in hospital" [The Age, 2 May 
1988). 
OPM sources were quoted in the PNG press as saying 
that the attack followed ''Indonesian retribution for an 
OPM attackooa workpartyon tle Wutung-Jayapura road''. 
Trey a:lrnitt:ed that some of their fighters "went too far" 
in the ferocicy of the attack [Post Courier, 2 May 
1988). A few days later, a statement was issued from 
Marlcas Besar, inside West Papua, (the headquarters of 
the OPM wing asscciat:ed with Jacob Prai), on behalf of 
Mathias Wenda, the regional commander of Jayapura, 
takin:J responsibility for the attack. He said the attack 
had been plamed by OPM leaders meeting on 7 March and 
that on 11 March, "OPM fighters attacked Arso and killed 
Indonesian men. women and children" [The Times of PNG, 
5-11 May 1988). 
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R umkorern disowns attack on 
trans migrants 
Speakingforthe National Liberation Army, tre armed 
wing of the OPM wrose headquarters is called Markas 
Victoria. Seth Rumkorem, the gtErrilla leader who is now 
arefugeein Athens, told TAPOL that attacking civilian 
targets, especially innocent people, is not tre habit of 
the NLA, which has never taken civilians, particularly 
irmocent people, as ha;tage. The way in which the attack 
on Arso was carried indicates that it was not oonducted 
by the NLA. Rumk.orem believes the attack has all tre 
hallmarks of an operation by Kc:.passus, the elite para-
commando unit4 and adds that he believes the same mrlt 
was behind a letter circulated late last year said to 
have been sent by the OPM to President SUharto. The 
letter, dated 13 June 1987., warned: "The deadline is the 
end of 1987. 1f by then, you have not granted us our 
independence, we shall obliterate all other ethnic 
groups now living on our soil, without exception." 
According to information received by E liezer Bonay, 
also of the NLA, who is now a refugee in Holland, tre 
N LA launched a series of attacks in the Jayapura area in 
early March but trese were directed at bridges and roads 
in Holtekan/ Arso, Jayapura, Skouw and Batas. 
PNG Catholic Commission 
criticises refugee policy 
The PNG Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace and 
Developmentisve:rycritical of the PNG government for 
failing in its obligations as a signatory of the UN 
Cawent:im on Refugees. The Commission made a number of 
oomplaioc.s about the treatmmt of West Papuan refugees, 
including not allowing t.rem freedom of movement in and 
out of PNG. 
The refugees are not being given decent housing or 
allowed access to public educaticn, their certificates, 
diplomas and degrees are not recognised nor do trey have 
opp:>rturllties for employment. For those with permissive 
residence and family ties in Papua New Guinea, the 
government should facilitate their nablralisation and 
assimilation into PNG society. The Commission accused 
the government of shirking its responsibilities by 
leaving things to the UN High Commission for Refugees. 
It also called on the government to take responsibility 
for fi.rxling countries willing to re-settle the West 
Papuan refugees [ Niugini Nius, 22 February 1988). 
UN H c R wants PNG to settle the refugees 
permanently 
The UN High Commissim for Refugees wruld like the PNG 
g::>vemmen: to consider allowing West Papuan refugees to 
re-settle permarently in Papua New Gui.ne:i if they c:annot 
reb.lrn home or find third-country asylum, according to 
Akilajah Akiwumi., t.re UNHCR Liaison Officer in Port 
Moresby. Akiwumi made this statement soortly before 
leaving Papte New Guinea to take up a ~e~ assignment. 
He said it was proving extremely difficult to find 
third-oount:ry asylum for West Papuan refugees. Two 
refugees were sent to Greece in 1982 and five were sent 
toGhanainl986, all oft.rem OPM guerrilla leaders.whom 
the p NG g::>vemment refused to allow to remain m the 
country. These seven refugees are still waiting for a 
country that will accept them for resettlement. 
Akiwumi also hoped that those refugees who have not 
oompleted degree courses would be allowed to complete 
treir studies in Papua New Guinea, and people with 
professional training to resume their professions. SO 
far only one high-school teacher is teaching in R abaul, 
whlle efforts fbr other refugees are still under way. 
But Akiwumi also expressed gratitude to tre government 
and people of P NG for allowing the refugees to stay and 
for showing them generosity in many respects [Times af 
Papua New Guinea, 25 February - 2 March 1988]. 
Two thousand refugees transferred to 
East Aw.in 
By the middle of March this year, just over two thousand 
of the ten thousand West Papuan refugees now in Papua 
New Guirea, ma;tof woom fled from West Papua in 1984, 
had been transferred to East Awin. Information about the 
new camµ; in EastAwinhas reachErl TA POL from a refugee 
who was moved there from Telefomin last year. The most 
striking thing is the isolation and difficulty of 
access. 
So far, eight camps have been set up in East Awin. 
Se'\enofthe camps are named after the camps where the 
refugees were previously living, meaning that trey co~e 
from the same reg:ions in West Papua. The eighth camp is 
called Jameso, an acronym for Jayapura, Merauke and 
Sorong, because the inhabitants come from all parts of 
West Papua. Jameso has now become tre centre of Iow ara 
Refugee Camp, the base from which UN andPNG government 
officials operate. 
The camps are widely dispersed in East Aw in arrl are 
several hours journey from K iunga, the nearest town and 
capital of North Fly Province. It is fifty kilometres by 
road from Iowara to Rimsait4 a wharf. The river trip 
fran R.irnsait to Kiunga adds another one-and-a half hours 
to the journey. During heavy rains, the road is 
impassable so the whole camp is completed cut off. 
Contact with East A win will continue to be difficult 
until an airstrip is built but this will not apparently 
be done until there are six thousand refugees i.h the 
areL ~ 
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Operation Clean-Out in Western Biak 
by: John P. Rumbiak 
In an effort to capture, dead or alive, the leader of 
the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, the Free Papua 
Movement) in Western Biak, Cendrawasih Bay, troops of 
theVIID:h/ UdayanaMilitary Command have been flown in. 
to West Pap.la. The Udayana Military Command includes the 
territory of East Timor, where military operations are 
also unrer wey against armed resistance under Fretilin's 
leadership. [West Papua, or Irian Jay a as the 
Indonesians call it, is in the territory of the 
VIIth/Trikora Military Command.] 
The InCbnesian army has been trying for the past 
twenty-two years to crush OPM operations in West Biak 
unrerthe leadership of Melldarus Awom, better krown by 
his non-de-guerre, K onsup (K omandan Super:i.ori). These 
efforts were recmtly stepped up with an cperation code-
named Operasi Sapu Rata or Operation Clean-Out. The 
previous operation cooe-named Operasi Sate or Operation 
Skewered-Meat was launcredin 1986, but OPM activities 
have continued unabated in all parts of west Papua. 
The chief target in the latest operation is kampung-
dwellers in the countryside suspected of supporting the 
guerrillas and supplying them with food. Their sago 
stands and gardens have been cut down and burnt. The 
objective is to deprive the guerrillas of fOOO., forcing 
them to give up the struggle. But in a further move to 
force Melkianus to surrenrer, his wife arrl children have 
been arrested by the District Military Commam in the 
town of Biak. 
As a result of the latest operations, kampung dwellers 
are now facing severe fuod shortages because they depend 
almost entirely on their nearby sacp stands and food 
gardens. They are also forbidden to hunt or gather food 
in the forest because they might make contact with the 
guerrillas. Under such systematic pressure and 
intimidation, arrl deprived of essential food supplies, 
many villagers have drifted into the town, moving in 
with relatives with jobs or a livelihood there. 
There is nothing new about these operations. One such 
operation, called Operasi Pamtmgkas (the meaning of this 
term is not clear), which was launched in the early 
1970s when Brigadier-General Acub Zainul was the 
military rommander, is described in a history of the 
Xvnth/ Cendrawasili Military Command which was µlblislai 
in 1978. 1) This operation was concentrated in Bird's 
Head and North Biak which was the base-area for 
Melkianus A worn and his guerrillas. The Indonesian 
soldiers, equi~ w.ith mooern weapons against a core of 
167 guerrilla fighters with no more than fifteen 
firearms between them, inflicted many losses on the OPM. 
Amaig ttose shot read during the operation were Captain 
Lodewijk Asaribab, Second-Lieutenant Laurens Awom, 
Sergeant-Maj:>r Ananianandseveral more whose names are 
not known. First-Lieutenant Yuliana Bonsapia, Second-
Lieutenant Yacob Suspater and an OPM supplier in Biak 
town, Hendrik Tan, an ethnic Chinese, were among tmse 
captured during this operation. 
The pa:>ple liv.ing .in the kamptmgs have always been the 
1. camr Wama- Empd:belas Tctul Kcrlam XVII Cemrawas:ih 
(1963-1977), (Fourteen years of the Regional Military 
Command XVII/Cendrawasih) 1978, page 36. In 1985, the 
XVIlth/Cerrlrawasill Commarrl became the VIIth/Trikora 
Military Command for Irian Jaya and Maluku. 
Melkianus Awom in West Biak, in late 1987. 
chief victims of these brutal operations, including the 
elderly, children and women. This is why it is so 
important for international human rights agencies to 
protect the people of West Papua from a repetition of 
the fate inflicted on the native people of America and 
Australia. 
OPM leader Melkianus Avom 
Melkianus A worn is the brother of Ferry A worn, the 
renowned founder and leader of the revolution of the 
people of West Papua and better known as Father of the 
OPM. Melkianus fought side ~ side with his brother and 
tther learers, LOOewijk Mandatjan and Barend Mandatjan, 
when the OPM first launched the armed struggle in 
Manokwari in 1965, in order to resist the presence of 
the Indonesian nee-colonial army on West Papuan soil. 
All these leaders were captured and killed. 
Before continuing tre armed struggle in Cemraw asill 
Bay ·region, Melkianus A worn and his comrade-in-arms 
Zacharias K afiar undertook a dangerous am historic 
miss:ion, travelling by sea to Pap.ia New Guinea, stx:pping 
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on the way at Numfor and Biak islands and at Holland.la 
(now Jayapura). After arriving in Wubmg, on the PNG 
side of the border, Melkianus and Zacharias handed aver 
documents setting out the aims and ideals of the OPM 
struggle to Australian govemment officials, ~ be 
passed on to the United Nations. After accomplishing 
their mission, the two men rebl.med home and have been 
leading the OPM struggle in west and North Biak ever 
since. The struggle has continued for twenty-two years 
without any political or material help from abroad. 
Jyl 
"Indonesia planning early push into Papua New Guinea" 
A Swiss pilot who worked for a Catholic missicnary air 
service in West Papm for s:ix months until he and his 
family made a spectacular escape to Australia, has told 
the press that he has documents to prove that the 
Indcnesian military are planning to make a push into 
Papua New Guinea within s:ix months. 
The pil~ Theooor Frey, left Nabire in West Papua 
secretly with his wife and daughter abrc:ad a Cessna 182 
aircraft and arrived in Nhulunbuy, the northem-most tip 
of Australia. They had no flight plan and only two 
litres of fuel left when they landed without warning, 
after a five-hour flight. They left Nabire with enough 
fuel for cnly five hours flying, knowing that any head 
wind on the way could have lengthened tOO flight-time, 
meaning they would run out of fuel before reaching 
safety. 
Frey said that Irrlonesian military forces in West 
Papua "were <ping into remote areas and setting up 
armored villages s:> they can move military forces into 
Pap.ia New Guirea wl'e1 ttey are ready. We think Australia 
should be worried and be closely watching what is <ping 
ort". [ Northern Territory News, 9 May 1988.J 
Flying for the military 
When the family first arrived, they refused to speak 
to the press because they feared for the safety of 
frierrls still in Indonesia, though the pilot's wife, 
Martha, said that they had fled because they were afraid 
of the Ind:>nesian armed forces. Theodor Frey was 
employed by a Dutch Cat:h:>lic mission within the 
Associated Mission Air (AMA). AMA is owned by the 
Cat:h:>lic Church and provides air services for isolated 
government posts and church communities1 as such, it is 
not unusual for its aircraft to be used by the military 
[The Age, 29 April]. 
The family arrived in Australia without passports 
because it is AMA policy for passports of members of 
staff to be held at the company's office. The immediate 
cause of the sudden departure appears to have been that 
the pilot felt himself caught between two opposing 
forces, on the cne hand the military who were harassing 
him, and on the other, local inhabitants who suspected 
him- of working for the military. 
After remaining for ten days in Gove, near the 
airstrip where they landed, the family moved to a secret 
address in Brisbane. It was from here that they spc:ke 
more freely to the press ct>out their fears for Papua New 
Guinea. [Sunday Sm, 8 May, Sunday Territorian, 8 May 
and Northern Territory News, 9 May 1988.] * 
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Japan seen as Indonesia's economic saviour 
With the 1988 meeting of the Inter-G01Termental Group on 
Indonesia due on 15-16 June, Suharto's new team of 
ecx:o:>mic ministers have been busy trying to persuade key 
IG GI member-states and the World Bank to provide more 
ecooomic aid this time round than last year's record 
commitment of $3.15 billion. 
Incbnesia's official debt is now in excess of $35 
billion and almost forty per cent of foreign exchange 
earnings must be used to service the debt. (A much 
higher figure - $43.2 billion - for the total foreign 
debt is often mentioned, which includes loans for 
special projects such liquified nabJral gas plant 
eq:>ansion in Aceh and East Kalimantan.) As Jakarta sees 
it. the heavy burden of this debt can only be alleviated 
with the help of Japan, which alone accamts for 32 per 
cent of the total. The size of Indonesia's debt 
rei:ayment problem has been exacerbated by the stronger 
yen against the dollar, sharply inflating the dollar 
value of repayments to Japan. But an additional problem 
for Ind:nesia is the shaky position of state revenues 
which have taken a battering because of the fall in oil 
prices resulting in lower tax payments from the oil 
companies. As a resul~ 36.6 per cent of state receipts 
are now allocated to buy foreign currency to repay the 
country's overseas obligations. This has serious 
consequences for many development projects which are 
unable to proceed because rupiah needs are drying up. 
Attention has therefore been focussed on persuading 
Japan to substantially increase its aid rommitment to 
Irxlonesia in 1988/89, to grant all this aid not in 
project aid butin commodity aid which can be converted 
into rupiahs, arxl to give Indooesia concessions 
regarding the repayment of its outstanding debt. 
Spiralling Japanese aid 
Japarese aid to Indooesia granted within the IGGI 
doubled in two years, up from $303.2 million in 1985 to 
$473,6 million in 1986 and $606.8 million in 1987. 
JapaneseaidaCCOJ.ntedfornearly twenty per cent of the 
total IGGI rommitmentin 1987, multilateral as well as 
bilateral. Japan's commitment was more than three times 
the next largest cbnor, the USA which pledged $190 
million [Kompas, 7 May 1988]. 
According to Japan's leading ecooomic daily, Nilx>n 
Keizai Srlnbln [3 March 1988], Incbnesia has asked Japan 
to grant no less than $770 million this year. Moreover, 
Indonesia wants all this to be rommitted in commodity 
aid and hence coovertible into rupiahs. This has given 
rise to controversy in Japan, the paper says, because 
''until now, Japan has persistently taken the positicrl 
that aid should enhance self-reliance". 
Most peq:>le may find it difficult to understand how 
getting irto debt on such a scale can be equated with 
striving towards self-reliance. It would be closer to 
the truth to say that the absence of any project aid is 
bad news for Japanese exporters who rely on overseas 
projects to provide them with markets. 
The lengths to which the Suharto government has gone 
to plead its case with Tokyo have been widely publicised 
in Indonesia. Last December, during the meeting in 
Manila of ASEAN heads of govemmen~ Suharto made a 
personal plea to Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita for 
concessions in the terms of Indonesia's repayments to 
An Indonesian sweat-shop. The Indonesian textile 
industry is gradually entering the world market. 
Japan. In February, he sent Professor Widjoyo Nitisastra 
on a mission to Tokyo to deliver a letter to Takeshita 
suggesting three options regarding the concessions 
(Widjojo's second visit to Tokyo in a year as Suharto 
messenger-boy). In March a high-level financial team 
also visited Tokyo to discuss the details of the 
proposed concessioos. 
So when Japanese Foreign Minister Sa.lsuke Uno visited 
Jakarta in April, hopes ran high that he would, as 
Finance Minister J.B. Sumarlin put il4 "bring us some 
good news". But after completing his round of meetings 
with ministers arrl having a session with Suharto, Uno 
spoke briefly at a press ronference and offered nothing, 
much to the disappointment of one and all. 
Incbresia' s ecoromic dependeoce on Japan should not be 
urrler-estimat: No-coe believes for a moment that Japan 
will leave Irrlooesia in the lurch, but in addition to 
fighting cppcsitioo centred in the Ministry for 
International Trade and!rrlustry, Takeshita's gOl/ernment 
fears that concessions to Indonesia, its largest debtor, 
will encourage other debtors to demand similar special 
treatment. 
Japan's oil interests are also roping to reap benefits 
from the :rea:nt a(:p)intmentof Ginandjar K artasasmita as 
oil minister, the first science graduate from a Japanese 
university to get a place in an Incbnesian cabinet. 
Recently, Ginandjar invited Japan to become a major oil 
producer in Irxlonesia, spreading alarm among us 
contractors who have loog dominated the Indonesian 
petroleum industry [UP~ 11 April 1988, reported in 
InOCinesia News Service, No 96,2 May 1988]. 
US monopoly cootrol of the petroleum industry was 
established after beating off a determined effort in the 
early 1970s by Japarese oil rompanies to gain a foothold 
in Incbnesia when a tac:i.t agreement was reached between 
Suharto and US and Japanese oil interests, according to 
____. 
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which Japan would crnfine itself to liquified natural 
gas prodoction. [See Wayne Robinron, ''Imperialism, 
Deperrlency and Peripheral Industrialisation: the Case of 
Japan in Indonesia" in South-East Asia: Essays in the 
Political Ecooomy of structural Change, ed: H iggott aoo 
Robiron, 1985, page 208) Oil interests in Japan may now 
see a chance of using Indonesia's foreign exchange 
crisis and a Japanese-traired oil minister to change the 
face of the oil industry in Indrnesia. 
IG GI aid to increase sharply 
According to leaks from the World Bank's Report for 
1988, to be submitted to the ooming IGGI meeting, the 
World Bank has recommended a total aid commitment of 
$3 .8 billim, 19 per cent higher than last year[ Jakarta 
P~ 19 May 1988). 
World Bank Vice-President, Attila Karaosmanoglu, 
anmunood during a visit to Jakarta in May that World 
Bank credit to Indonesia will increase frcm $1.1 billion 
EASTTIMOR 
lastyearto $1.2 billion. Karaosmanoglu lavish~ praise 
on Indonesia's economic managers for the read3ustments 
and deregulation introduced in the past few ye~s. 
The west German Minister for Economic Co-CFeration, 
Hans Klein also used the occasion of a visit to 
Indonesia to announce an increase in aid from $7 2.9 
million last year to $100 billion this year. In 
adli.tion, Germany has promised credit of $100 million to 
support seven projects in Sumatra. 
Many western leaders have praised Indonesia for 
refusing to consider prCFQsals to re-schedule foreign 
debt repayments. They include Dutch Deputy Prime 
Minister, R.W . de Korte, who said in January, that "a 
requestfor postponement would cause the world oo longer 
to have oonfidence in Indoresia". US Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston 
Sigur said during a visit, "We regard any steps to re-
schedule debt as unrealistid'. IMF Managing-Director, 
Mkflel Canrlesus warned Ind::nes.ia that debt-re-scheduling 
could lead to "long-term problems of tightened credit 
and constricted capital outlays". [See Indonesian News 
Service, Nos 71, 73 a00 74.) West Germany's Hans Klein 
also welcomedincbnesia'sdecis.ion to ooncentrate rn how 
to repay its debt rather than how to postpone it 
( ltanpa& 4 May 1988). With soch enthusiasm for Jakarta's 
eccnomic management, this year's IG GI meeting is certain 
to exceed all expectations. l} 
Ti1norese refugee on Indonesian operations 
in East Ti1nor since 1975 
Cristiano Costa lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded by Indonesian troops two days after Dili was 
invaded. He fled to the mountains and spent the next three years in the bush. From 1979 till 198i he lived in Indonesian-
occupied Baucau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from Indonesia while in Jakarta. 
After a short stay in Macau, he reached Lisbon in February and testified before the UN Human Rights Commission in March. 
This is the second part of an interview by TAPOL. The final part will appear in TAPOL Bullet.in No. 88. 
Can you speak about the arrival of InOOnesian forces in 
Baucau in December 1975, after the invasion in Dill? 
Before the invasion, it was Indrnesia's intention to 
take control of the whole of East Timor in 72 hours, 
taking Dill rn the first day, B aucau on the second, and 
Los Palos on the third. They thought that Fretilin 
forces were vecy weak and oould easily be smashed, and 
that by controlling the three towns, with the border 
region already in their hands, F retilin would be forced 
to surrender. But~ resistance in Dili frustrated this 
strategy. The IOOonesians only managed to cootrol parts 
of Dill along the roast in the first two days. 
But they had taken the airfield rn Atauro Island which 
they used as the base from which to attack Baucau and 
Los Pala3. On 9 Decenber, Incknesian aircraft bombed the 
airfield at Baucau. F retilin had no air power, but its 
troops held defence positirns rourrl the airfield. 
On 10 December, the Indonesians used Kopasgat, the 
a:l.rlx>me commarrl:s or rapid-deployment troops, who were 
paracmted in, as well as naval craft to land troops at 
Waigaka, east of Baucau, on the way to Los Palos, 
between Baucau arrl Lada. Trere was little resistance in 
Baucau, nothing like the resistance in Dill. Fretilin 
forces had withdrawn to Venilale, about 30 kms south. 
The captnre of Baucau 
The invasion threw Fretilin forces in Baucau into 
disarray though there was some resistance round the 
airfield. But because of the ferocity of Indooesian 
forces in Baucau, many inhabitants fled to the hills. 
What do you mean by ferocity? 
The way the troops swooped down from the air, lamed 
on the roast, arxl entered the town in their panzers, 
firing machine-guns aooother weapons. It was terrifying 
and people fled, seeking protectioo with Fretilin. 
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Were there arrests and shootings like in o ill? 
Yes, but not on the scale of what happened in Dili 
where the resistance was much stronger. In Baucau, the 
resistance was much weaker, and as a resul~ fewer 
people were. killed. A week after gaining control of 
Baucau airfield, the Indcnesians began to advance 
towards Vi.keke. They met with fie~ resistance here and 
it was alrna;ta matl:h-arrl-a-half befure they overpowered 
the resistance and took control of the town. But Los 
Palos was already in In:lonesian hands: it was the second 
town to fall, about a week after the invasion in Dill. 
A month or so after the Indcnesian invasion, a 
delegation of some sort came, I think from the United 
Nations, early in 1976. By this time, I had fled to the 
bush but my family was still in Baucau, arrl they saw how 
the Indonesians hid their tanks from the u N visitor 
even digging huge holes in which to hide their tanks: 
But although Dill, Baucau and Los Palos had been 
Traditional East Timorese village. 
taken, the Ind:nesians were unable to destroy F retilin, 
so they pursued a strategy of gaining control of all the 
district towns. During 1976, Inoonesia aimed to ccntrol 
the towns and set up a government in Dill. In May, an 
assembly met in Dill and adopted a petition asking 
President 9.lharto to incorporate East Tirnor, so on 17 
July 1976, East Tirnor was proclaimed as Inoonesia's 27th 
province. Yet at that time, only 15 to 20 per cent of 
the population was un&r Inoonesian control. The rest 
had fled to the interior with Fretilin whlch quickly re-
organised itself arrl gave p rotecticn to the population. 
This must have been a gigantic task for Fret:ilin with so 
many people coming from the towns. 
Yes, mcnyof the towns in Indcnesian hand; at the time 
were virtually empcy of peq>le. Fretilin set about re-
organising itself, basing itself on the support of the 
populatioo.. It created shock brigades of people from 
different regions who were traired in the technique of 
warfare, former members of the Portuguese colonial army. 
Respcndingto Fretilin's strategy, the In:lonesians began 
a new strategy to destroy the shock brigades. The new 
sfrate;Jy started from the western border region in 197 7. 
By this time, as the Indcnesians knew, Fretilin was 
getting short of supplies. 
Onslaught against the population 
The new Irrlonesian operation was called Operasi Sapu 
Bersih or Operation Clean-Sweep. They began in the 
western sector and from there, they moved eastward to 
INTERVIEW 
the ~entral sector. They used all means, air-raids, 
bombardment from the sea and land-based troq:>s. Many 
guerrillas were killed or surrendered and thousands of 
people were killed or captured. 
In the central sector, there was fierce resistance, so 
it took them two months to overcome Fretilin. The ones 
who cpt killed during the bombing raids were ordinary 
people, not guerrillas, many of whom managed to escape. 
In the eastern sector, they encamtered even fiercer 
resistanc~ but by concentrating all their forces here, 
F retilin was forced to retrea~ taking shelter in the 
Matabean mountains. But they weren't able to hold out 
because of the strength of Inoonesia's forces. A huge 
number of people were killed during the attack on 
Matabean, perhaps as many as 20,000 people. Most died 
during the bombing raids or were killed by Indcnesian 
troops. 
Did yw experience any of these bombing raids? 
I first saw an air-raid in Vikeke, in the village of 
Bibileo. Then later in Aitana, near Lakluta, and the 
third time, in Natarbora. The Bibileo raid didn't kill 
anyore: as soon as we heard the planes approaching, we 
ran for cover. Not many people were killed during the 
Lakluta raid; either, but many were killed in Natarbora. 
Indcnesianpooitions in Natarbora had been attacked by 
F retilin, causing many Indoo.esian casualties. So the 
Indcnesian ground forces asked for air support. Three 
aircraft - I think they were Skyhawks - bombed the 
region, killing thousands of people. In particular wome~ children and old people were killed, people wh~ 
couldn t run for cover. They were killed in large 
numbers. All we oouldcb was pray for God's protection. 
The planes came in low and sprayed the ground with 
bullets, with their machine-guns, killing many people. 
When the raids began in the east, the people were 
still with Fretilin. They had fled south with Fretilin 
so there were manypeq>lein Natarbora. It was here that 
peq>le began tri oome Cbwn from the mountains to areas 
controlled by the Indaiesians. 
Why did they come down? 
The ecx:l'lomic situation was beooming very bad irrleed 
Moreo1Ter, Fret:i.linforces were by this time dispersed in 
many dimct:ions because they hoo to seek p rotectiai fran 
the air raids. So the population moved back into the 
towns which were controlled by the Indcnesians. Here 
they were driven into concentration camps which later 
became known as the pemukirnan, or resettlements. 
The strategy used in that Indonesian offensive was 
very effective but even so, many Fretilin guerrillas 
survived. So in late 1978, the Inoonesians launched a 
second operation in the eastern sector which was called 
SaI;>u Bersih Kedua, the Seoond Clean-Sweep Operation. 
This was after they had smashed Matabean. Fretilin 
forces ~ere oow wi&lydispersa:1, so it was easy for the 
Irrlonesians to concentrate their troops to go out in 
search of certain targets. 
Fretilin leaders murdered 
Then, they got information that there was to be a 
meeting between Nirolau Lobato, Antonino Carvarino arrl 
Vicente Reis, leading members of Fretilin's permanent 
oomm.it:tee. Ind:>nesian trcops managed to track down each 
of them and before they were able to meet and disruss 
the situation, they were all killed. Lobato was killed 
in Mindelu, near Kabalaki. Carvari.no was apparently 
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captured near F ihukrin in the region of Same. Vicente 
Reis was shot in the leg but wasn't captllred. I cbn't 
know what happened to him after that. 
The elimination of these three guerrilla leaders 
caused widespread demoralisation among the forces of 
resistance and many surrendered. Among the first to 
sun:en<Er, in 1978, was Alatico Fernandes with the radio 
transmitter. Then many were captured or surrendered. I 
think as many as 10,000 resistance fighters fell into 
enemy hands. 
Where were you at the time? 
With a oompany in Baucau regicn, near Ostiko. About 
two hundred of us surrerrlered, leaving very few Fretilin 
forces in the region. I surrendered in Ostiko on 17 
April 1979 and after being held there for a couple of 
days, I was sent to Venilale. After two weeks, I was 
sent to Baucau am re-joined my family. I wasn't in 
captivity but I had to report to the army once a week. 
My family had already returned five or six mcnths 
earlier. When they fl.Erl to the mountains, the house was 
left empty and everything was looted by the Indonesians. 
Then the ha.lse was burnt down. So they lived in a hut. 
Some of their land had been taken by pecple who hadn't 
fled to the mountains. My parents are poor peasants. 
Bow did things develq> after Fretilin's virtual 
extermination? 
The Indcnesians made an almost oomplete sweep of 
Fretilin fo:rces. There were reports that Xanana had been 
shot dead in U at:ulari, south of the eastern sector. 
The Fence-of-Legs Operation 
Following the revival of Fretilin forces in 1980, the 
Indooesians da:::ided to la\Dlch a new operation called 
Pagar Bet.is or Ferx..-e-af-Legs. The Irrlooesians used forty 
battalions and mobilised all men 0\7er the age of 17 who 
were strong mough to walk and go up mountains to take 
p~ not just in the east but from the whole of East 
Timor. 
Bow did the Incbnesians :recruit all these people? 
They gave instructions to the village heads and the 
sub-district chiefs who told the population to join in. 
The 'fence' consisted of three lines. The frcnt line 
consisted of Incbnesian troops, then there was a line of 
people with Irore Incbnesian troops, and behind them a 
third line consisting of Indonesian trocps. The fence 
started in the extreme west of the country and went cbwn 
south, then along the roast to the east, then up north 
and along the north roast to oomplete the circle. It was 
like a huge fence encircling the whole country which 
moved slowly forward, getting smaller and smaller. The 
operation took three months, from May to August 1981. It 
hemmed in Freti.lin forces, coocentrating them in Aitana. 
Eadlday, we ITU1TErlforward. The Indonesian plan was to 
push F retilin fo:rces back to Aitana. The huge fence 
reached Aitana region at the end of July. It was here 
that a ghastly massacre occurred. Many people still 
under Fretilin's protection were slaughtered in cold 
blood. They murderErl everyone, from tiny babies to the 
elderly, unarmed people who were not involved in the 
fightin:J but were tb:?re simply because they had stayed 
with Fretilin and wanted to live freely in the 
mowitains. There were reports that Xanana had been 
killed - a second time. The Indonesians believErl it but 
it was a guerrilla ruse. They had taken his clothes and 
put them on the body of a dead guerrilla. 
The Aitana massacre 
Did you take part in the fence of legs? 
Yes, I was in a team of Timorese who had all fought 
previously in the bush. We were anned and used by the 
Indonesicns to take part in the pagar betis. I was with 
the troops when they reached Aitana. But I did not go ~n 
with the front-line troops which attacked Fretilin 
forces 91rrounded in Aitana. We were behind. But when 
Eosf Timorese guerr i I los on the move. 
th? at::tcck was over and mcpping-up operations were under 
way a week or two later, our team entered the area. It 
was a ghastly sight. There were a great many bodies, 
men, women, little children, strewn everywhere, 
Wlburied, along the river banks, on the mountain slopes. 
I would estimate that about ten th:>usand people had been 
killed in the operatic:tl. There were so many decomposing 
bodies that the stench was Wlbearable and we couldn't 
stay in the area. The Indonesian soldiers showed no 
mercy to anyone. Even tiny babies were slaughtered. 
Didn't anycne get away? 
Some pecple escaped from the encirclement but all 
th:se wm were cau#lt were massacred. They were not only 
fran Ait:ana butfrom all over, people who had been swept 
along by the advancingtrocps. That's why so many people 
were there. And everyone was killed. 
To be concluded. 
• 
Transmigration and defence 
In a wide-ranging interview on his plans for the fut:ur~ 
of transmigratioo, the new Minister of Transmigration, 
Lieutenant-General Soegiarto said that by promoting 
economic development in the sparcely-populated homer 
regions with the resettlement of transmigrants from 
Java, Incbnesia's territorial defence will be 
reinforced. He listed ''Indonesia's vast border regions 
where defence needs to be strengthened, such as the 
Mentawai, Nias and Simelue string of islSnds along the 
west roast of Sumatra, the Riau Islands near the South 
China Sea, the Sangir-Talaud Islands north of Sulawesi 
and the tmusands of islands in the provinces of Maluku 
and Irian Jaya' [ Kompas, 21 May 1988]. 
The Minister spoke of plans to enhance the role of 
private capital in the transmigration programme. This 
interview and other developments will be discussed in 
the next issue of TAPOL Bulletin. 
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Military operations in East Tinior during 1987 
Two major military operations were launched by the 
Indcnesian army during 1986 and 1987, causing many 
civilian casualties among the Timorese. 
Since the invasion in December 1975, the Indonesian 
armed forces have repeatedly launched small, medium or 
large-scale attacks, either against the Fretilin 
guerrillas or attacking innocent East Timorese in the 
countryside. In the words of Inacio Moura, who left East 
Timor last December after working for several years in 
the East Timor 'provincial' administration, entire 
villages have been decimared. "The exact number of those 
killed is difficult to know, but an estimate of that 
tragic number may be put at around 200,000 victims, 
given the huge proportion of the population who have 
disappeared." Maira estimates that the Irrlonesian armed 
forces have lost more than 15,000 troops killed in the 
fighting with the Timorese resistance: 
The (Indonesian) soldiers are tired of so much war. 
They are there but thinking of their families. They 
die, or are mutilated, and afterwards live a miserable 
life. Many soldiers say: 'We come here to die while 
the generals in Jakarta are living at our expence.' 
The military command structnre 
in East Timor 
At times when there are no large-scale operations 
under way, Indonesia's territorial army in East Timor 
consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers. During 
operaticns, divisions and battalions fran all parts of 
the country are flown in. Virtually every military unit 
in Indcnesia has had combat experience in East Timar. 
Acoording to a report from East Timar on the military 
Indonesian red-berets of Kopassus, arriving at Boucau 
airport in July 1987, with the assigrvnent to capture 
Folintil CorTTTl(Jnder Xonana, dead or olive. 
siblation in November, women's military units were 
brought .in to take wer s:>me of the territorial duties, 
such as populaticn control. 
The territorial oommand in East Timar is the Komando 
Resor Militer, or Military Resort Command, krown as 
Korem 164/Wira Dharma, with its headquarrers in Dili. 
Thepresentcommameris Infantry Colonel Machfud who 
took wer from Colmel Yunus Yosfiah at the errl of 1987. 
Inl983, aspocialcommand was setup fur East Timor, 
the Komancb Operasi Keamanan East Timor, or Security 
Operations Command for East Timor, known as Kopskam 
Timtim. Kcpskam Timti.m is always under the commarrl of 
the commander of the first division of Kostrad, the 
army's strategic reserve corps, the best trained and 
equipped corps .in the Indonesian army. Unlike Korem 
164/Wira Dharma which is under the Military Regional 
CommandIX/Udayana basedin Bal~ Kcpskam Timtim is 
under the armed forces commander-in-chief. The present 
K opskam commander is Brigadier-General Mantiri. The 
prev:ia.ls commarrler, Brigadier-General Sugito later moved 
to the prestigious post of Jakarta military commarrler 
and is now commander of Kostrad. 
The 1986-87 military operation 
In June 1986, Indonesia launched an operation called 
Operasi Kikis, or Operatim Extircticn which lasted one 
year and was rerminated in May 1987. In July 1987, a 
special cperation was launched with the arrival of one 
tlnusand spocial red-beret troops, under the comm arrl of 
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Colooel Soenarto. The primary objective of this 
operation was to track cbwn and eliminate the Fretilin 
A red-beret (Kopossus) comnonder giving instructions to 
his men, out on operations in o mountainous port of 
Boucou region. 
guerrilla leader, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, who has led 
Falintil, the armed resistance in East Timor, since 
1979. In December 1987, Colonel Soenarto and his troops 
were withdrawn, having failed to achieve their goal. 
Operas! Kikis 
In a document written by Xanana in May 1987, the 
Falirtil romman<Er made the fullowing assessment of this 
operation: 
Following guerrilla attacks, wherever they have 
taken place, tie occupying forces always carry out 
reprisals of many kinds against the defenceless 
population. This is firstly in order to terrorise the 
people even further, seoondly, to implant the idea 
that if there were no armed resistance the population 
woold rot be suffering the consequences, and thirdly, 
to impress upon the guerrillas that no Indonesian 
soldier will be killed without someone from among the 
Timorese population being killed as well. 
In other words, Operati.oo Extinction was a response 
and retaliation to mounting F retilin actions all over 
Indonesian troops using radio and binoculars to monitor 
a bombing raid on guerrilla positions near Lokluto, in 
Morch 1987. 
the country. By inflicting harsh punishments and on-the-
spot executions on innocent villagers, the army intended 
to set an example while at the same ti.me spreading fear. 
The aim was to alienate the population from the 
guerrillas by blaming the latter for the sufferings and 
hardship caused by the Indonesian troops. 
In addition, an overwhelming military presence was 
neerled before and during the general elections in East 
Timor on 23 April 1987. In East Timor, a general 
election is nothing less than a military exercise, 
during which the entire population is herded into the 
polling booths. 
As with previous operati.oos, Operation Extinction 
involved troops brought in fresh from various regions. 
This ti.me they included Zipur Battalion 9, a combat 
battalion consisting of special commandos and army 
engineers, Battalion 744 from Central Sulawasit 
Battalion 527 from the Brawijaya East Java Division, 
Battalion 745 from North Sulawesit Battalion 714 fran 
south Sulawesit along with other battalions that have 
not been identified. According to Fretilin, altogether 
thirty-six battalions were deployed in the operation, a 
total of about 27 ,O 00 additional troops. 
There were reports of many clashes between the 
guerrillas and Indonesian troops. Skirmishes occurred 
almosteverywhere, with the focus on~ eastern sector. 
In late 1986 when fresh troops were disembarked at 
Tacitolu and Areia Branca, west of Dill, the troops 
moved quickly south. The first clashes were reported in 
Zurnalai, Bobonaro and Atsabe, all in the western sector. 
In the following months, tie troops moved eastward where 
the guerrillas have many strongholds. 
After the heavy bombing raids of the late 1970s, the 
guerrillas learned one important lesson - not to set up 
permanent bases as they are a sitting target for jet--
fighters and bombers. Inacio Moura stated in various 
interviews with the Portuguese press that one need only 
go to Baocau to see the military base frbm which US-
manufactured planes take off daily to bomb Freti.lin 
positions and zones occupied by the resistance. After a 
raid, ground forces are sent into the bombed area but as 
soon as they leave, the guerrillas return to their 
former positions. 
When the war zone moved east to the Los Palos region 
along the key road from Baucau to Vikeke, many 
Indonesian troops were ambushed. Refugees report that 
the Indonesians have virtually given up trying to 
control the road. Peq>le say that till 4 pm, the 
Indooesians rule, then Fretilin takes over. 
Many documents have reached the Freti.lin office in 
Lisbon reporting clashes during this period, and 
exposing the brutality of the Indonesian troops. One 
event in Il.iomar, in the eastern soctor, smrtly before 
~ elections, is typical: 
Some time in late February or early March 1987, 87 
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trocps of Zipur Battalion 9 entered Iliomar and forced 
the townspecple to gather in front of the military 
post. After threats of various kirrls, seventeen 
Timorese, including Jaime da Costa and Marti.nh:> 
Hornai, were bayonetted to death. 
Falintil guerrillas avoided direct confrontation with 
the eremy wln deployed a far greater number of troops 
than Falintil. But the guerrillas launched counter-
attacks whererer a:n:iitions were favourable. Nearing the 
end of Operation Extinctirn, in April and May, many 
Indooesian units were ambushed and hit by the 
guerrillas. On 12 May, guerrillas succeeded in shooting 
down an Incbnesian helicopter in the Barike district. 
Details of confrontations in April-May 1987 
3 April 
Fighting in Los Palos. One Indonesian officer was 
killed. 
17 April 
Two dead and two wounded Indonesian soldiers 
transported to Dili. 
This photo was taken in Luro region, 
neat Los Polos, on oreo of 'unrest'. 
lndones ion soldiers appear to be 
inspecting rows of Timorese men. The 
purpose of the inspection is not clear. 
The occ°"l'onying note soys that all 
travel in East Timor is strictly 
supervised md requires o travel permit 
(surot jalan). This may be a briefing 
before the men go to work in the 
fields. 
21 and 22 April 
Fighting on tie north coast of Lautem, directly north 
of Los Palos. Three guerrillas were killed and their 
weapons captured on the first day. Nine Indonesian 
soldiers were killed and their weapons seized on the 
serond day. 
Indonesian forces patrolling in the Lacluta area, in 
March 1987. 
Indonesian red-berets orravmg during the night in 
Baucou airport, to participate in Colonel Soenorto's 
operation. 
23 April 
On polling day, Falintil attacked Raimero village, in 
Same. Two soldiers were killed and one wounded; three 
weapons were seized A similar attack in Hatudo failed. 
Six dead Irrlonesian soldiers arrived in Dili. 
4 May 
Armed encounter with Battalion 714 in Liaruka/Ossu. 
Four Indonesian soldiers were killed and their weapons 
seized. One guerrilla was killed. 
10 May 
Six dead Irrlonesian soldiers were brought into Dill 
from Betano on the south coast. 
12 May 
An army helicq>ter was srotdown in Barike. According 
to some reports, it was hit and made a forced landing, 
tien took off and was hit again and crashed. 
17 May 
A Falintil unit interrepted a bus in Los Palos. 
* * * 
Altlnugh Operation Extinction came to an eoo in May, 
there was a report that in August 1987, forty-six 
armoured cars with heavy artillery units manned by 7 ,200 
soldiers arrived in East Timer. This was said to be in 
preparatioo for a plan to end armed resistance in East 
Timor by September 1988. 
1 
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The search for Xanana Gusmao 
A senior Indonesian officer giving instructions to men 
of a Kostrad battalion, in an army barracks in Baucau, 
in September 1987. 
One tlxruscnd red-beret Kopassus troq;>s were flown in 
to Baucau and Los Palos by Hercules aircraft on 11 and 
12 July 1987, W'der the commarrl of Colorel SOenarto. The 
sole assignment of the operation was to capblre F alintil 
oommander, Xanana Gusmao. 
The Soenartooperat:i.oo appears to have been a oombined 
intelligence-commando operation, the intention being to 
lure the guerrilla leader into negotiatioos through a 
church intermediary and to capb.lre Xanana during the 
talks. This nE!ITer happened. Indeed F alintil intelligence 
was clearly forewarned of the plans, and sent 
information abroad very quickly about the operation. 
Later, Falintil sent out photographs of the troops 
arriving, some of which are reproduced on these pages, 
which only confirms that they have well-established 
lines of communication within enemy ranks, keeping them 
well informed of every Wonesian move. 
The Soenarto troops were concentrated in the east 
where they hunted the elusive guerrilla leader. SOenarto 
sent outs ecret ag:mt:s to mingle among the Timorese to 
huntoown Xanana. One SJUroe stated that some commandos 
had been given lessons in Portuguese to help them mix 
better among the Timorese. 
In August, five of Soenarto's men were killed in Los 
Rl.la; ard twenw were g:ir:busly wourrled in an ambw:h. 
A combat-ready Kopassus unit, flown in to East Timor 
from Java, in July 1987. 
The wa.url:rl were flown back to Jakarta. Those guerrillas 
who were capblred were immediately interrogated for 
information of Xanana's whereabouts, but without 
success. On 16 and 17 October, a fresh batch of red-
berets arrived in Baucau and military equipment was 
unloaded at Lautem harbour. 
After failing in his mission, Colonel Soenarto 
reblnied to Jakarta on 12 December. Two weeks later, 
armed furces canmarrler-in-drlef, General Benny Murd~ 
stated that it would still take several years to put an 
end to armed resistance in East Timor. He estimated that 
there were about five hurrlred armed guerrillas in 
action. The report he received from Soenarto must have 
been very discouraging. 
Source: Nakroma, Nos 1 and 2, published by Fretilin 
Information Office {GIF), Lisbon, and documents from 
East Timor, obtained frcxn GIF and logged in various 
Memos published by East Timor News. 
Newly-arrived Indonesian red-berets at Baucau airport, 
receiving army insignia from local territorial troops, 
in July 1987. 
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AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA 
Ne-w ro-w -with Australian journalists 
Indcnesian consular officials have started a new 
diplomatic row between!nd:nesia and Australia because a 
poster advertising a play about five Australian 
television journalists killed by Irtdonesian troops in 
East Timor in October 1975 was displayed when three 
Indonesian TVRI (television) journalists visited the 
Darwin Press Club in May. 
After the joomalists had been at ~ club for some 
time withoutoomplaining, a consular official with them 
drew~ attslticn of the Irrlonesian Consul in Darwin to 
the "offending'' poster [Sunday Territorian, 8 May 1988). 
The Consul then announced that the journalists would be 
leaving the building at once. They later cut short their 
visit to Australia to reinforce their protest. 
The play, "Death at Balibo" is based on the tragic 
mumersofthe television journalists who were close to 
thebor:derbetween East and West Timor in October 1975, 
to record Indonesian military activities in the area. 
The circumstances in which they were shot dead by 
Indonesian troops have never been investigated, nor did 
the Australian government seek an explanation of the 
atrocity, let alone protest. Incbnesian officWs reveal 
by their absurb response to the poster that they are 
extremely embarrassed by the Balibo murders. 
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Foreign Minister Ali Alatas quickly oondemned the 
poster "insult" as "regrettable" while a senior TVRI 
official called the display of the poster a "set-up". It 
was "serious and deliberately provocative" and an 
attempt by Australian journalists to "exploit the 
situation" [Northern Territory News, 7 May 1988). Of 
course, oone of these indignant Irrlonesians have the 
slightest interest in finding out what happened in 
Balibo nearly thirteen years ago, one of the most 
shameful examples in the history of journalism of a 
cover-up, in this case, an atrocity aimed at concealing 
the truth about Irmnesian aggression in East Tirnor. 
Less than two weeks later, another "inciden~' was 
looming on tie horizon, with a protest by Tony Wen, the 
Indooesian Consul for Information (sic) in Sydney, 
against the planned screening on the SBS Vcoc Populi 
programme in May of a film exposing the activities of 
Indonesian diplomatic missions in Canberra, Sydney, 
Melbrume and Darwin which spy en Ind:::mesians living in 
Australia. In a blatant attempt at blackmail, Wen, a 
w~ll-kmwnfonner Opsusa~ saidthatapplications by 
Australian journalists to enter Incbnesia were in the 
pipe-line and the SBS report might ''not be conducive to 
improving relations with the Australian media'' [The 
Weekend Austra.liaI\ 14-15 May 1988). 
How long can the thaw last? 
There is currently said to be a 'thaw' in Jakarta's 
blanket discrimination against Australian journalists 
working in Drlore;ia which has been in force s.ince early 
1986. (One major Australian newspaper, The Australian, 
has been prevented from sending anyone to Incbnesia 
since 1982.) 
Recently, it was announced that the Australian 
Associated Press has been given permission to place a 
journalist in Jakarta fbr one year, arxl five Australian 
journalists were allowed to enter Indonesia to oover the 
celebrationof ANZAC DayinAmbon. They include Peter 
Hastings, long a close friend of the Suharto regime who 
nevertheless has been excluded from Indonesia for the 
past two years, and David Jenkins, Foreign Editor of 
Sydney Morning Herald whose article about the Suharto 
family fortunes, publisted in April 1986, so infuriated 
the Incbnesian government. But with all ~se 
'concessions', the journalists are expected to be on 
~ best behaviour, as if permission to visit 
Indcnesia is sorn e kind of special favour. 
As 'l1Je Weeken:i Australian oommented editorially in its 
7-8 May issue: 
Despite, or perhaps because of, all ~ efforts of 
Australian politicians to ingratiate ~mselves with 
the Indonesian Government, our northern neighbour 
ccntinues to treat this country with oontempt. •• 
It has to be assumed that the restrictions on the 
A~ media and their representatives result from 
unfavourable reports or comments on events in 
InCbnesia and, more particularly, criticism of 
Incbnesia's violent annexation of East Timor and its 
denial of a geniune act of self-determination to the 
people of tre former Portuguese colony .••• 
It is a feet that five Australians were killed in 
East Tirnor inl975. The Indonesian Government cannot 
make Australians forget what happened. * 
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Foreign affairs: New 1ninister, old proble1ns 
Incbnesia' s new Foreign Minister Ali Alatas is the first 
career diplomat to be appointed to the post by Suharto. 
His appointment suggests that Suharto is dissatisfied 
with the state of Indcnesia's foreign affairs and has 
turned this time to an experienced expe~ a 'tough 
ne<}:)tiator' as Alatas has been described in the press. 
He wo:tked his way up in the information division of 
the DepartmEtrt:af Foreign Affairs (he was then known as 
Alex, not Al.i), becaning spokespers::m for the Department 
in the early 1960s. His first pa;t after Suharto seized 
power was as political counsellor at the Indonesian 
embassy in Washington from 1966-70. He then held a 
succession of jobs as personal assistan~ and from 1978 
to 1982 was the personal assistant of Vice-President 
Adam Malik, Indonesia's longest-serving foreign 
minister. From 1983 till his appointment as minister 
this year, he was Wonesia's ambassador to the UN in 
New York. 
One of his major tasks as ambassador was to cq:>e with 
the question of East Timor, in particular the 
consultatioos with Portugal carried rut under the terms 
of res::>lution 37 /3 0 of the 1982 General Assembly. During 
his entire term in New York, no resolution was adq>ted 
by the General Assembly, a fact which former Foreign 
Mlll:ist:er Mochl:ar K usumaat:madja described as a 'boon' for 
Indcnesian diplomacy. 
In one of his first statements as Foriegn Minister, he 
admitted that East Timor was still a "nuisance" 
internationally. It has created "many misunderstandings 
and misoonceptials, even among our allies, thus creating 
difficulties in our diplomatic work" [Tempo, 16 April 
1988). 
Diplomatic setback in Dusseldo:rf 
Alatas had been in the job less than two months when 
he had his first major diplomatic setback. The cause as 
usual was East Tim or and the setting was the meeting of 
foreign ministers of the EEC and ASE AN countries in 
Dusseldorf held on 3-4 May (see separate item). 
Alatas is also trying to sabotage a strongly-worded 
resolution on East Timor to be voted on soortly by the 
Eurq:>ean Parliament. He has instructed Indonesian 
embassies in w estem Europe to lobby against it. A new 
tactic apparently initiated by him is to try and 
persuade people well-known for their criticism of 
Indonesia to go to East Timor on a guided tour, 
believing that the testimony of right-wing politicians 
anddiscredit:Erl journalists like Nuno Rocha has probably 
done more harm than good to Indonesia's propaganda 
efforts regarding East Timor. 
Leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement 
Alatas will als::> promote with renewed vigour SUharto's 
amb:it:kn to bea:me president of the Non-Aligned Movement 
from 1989, reversing Mochtar's failure at the NAM 
meeting in Luarrla in 198 5. At the NAM summit conference 
in Harare in 1986, Incknesia sent a huge delegation to 
lobby delegates but to no avail. 
It was at Harare that Iroonesia made a formal bid to 
chair the Movement next time round. Its main rival is 
Nicaragua, the more likely candidate since it is now 
Latin America's tum, following India and Zimbabwe. 
Alatas now claims that Indonesia and Nicaragua have 
agreed to support each other's bids for the next two 
terms, thrugh he did oot say whether they had agreed on 
who should come first. 
As part of Jakarta's attempt to win greater support 
from Third World countries and in particular to boost 
Indonesia's fortllnes in NAM, the Foreign Ministry 
recently announced the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Nicaragua and with Cyprus, the venue of 
this year's meeting of NAM foreign ministers which will 
decided on who will be the next NAM president. l} 
EEC countries adopt common stand on East Tim.or 
'!he twelve EEC countties have agreed to adopt a common 
stand on East Timor. The decision was adq>ted at the 
meeting of EEC arrl ASEAN foreign ministers in DusselCbrf 
in May. It was the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Joao de 
Deus Pinheiro, who raised the question, prq>asing that 
all the countries present soould adq>t a common stand. 
InCbnesia's Ali Alatas threatened to walk ou~ but a 
crisis was averted by an agreement to limit the oommon 
stand to the EEC countries ooly. Evens::>, this was a 
serious blow fur Indcnesia, aro will emance Portugal's 
and hence East Timor' s position at the u N General 
Assembly this year. 
At a press conference announcing the results of the 
meet:iDJ, the West Gennan Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich 
Genscher made the following statement:: 
As you know, in the Progress Report of the UN 
Secretary-General of 8 September (1987), it is said 
that "the two countries (Portugal and WonesiaJ agree 
to contirue the substantive talks with a view to 
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achieving a oomprehensive and internationally 
acceptable settlemen~·. 
What I can say here is that the Twelve take a 
favourable view of the existing contacts under the 
auspices of the UN Sa:::retary-General. The Twelve will 
make their agreed position known in greater detail in 
the UN whidl is the appropriate forum to address tffise 
matters. 
Commenting on thedecis.ion, Jose Ramos Horta, who has 
represented Fretilinat t:te UN since 1975, said this was 
a significant step forward. "Even though the statement 
is cautiously worded," he said, "it is significant 
because it is the first time the Twelve have issued a 
joint statement. It will bind them when a resolution 
comes before the UN General Assembly or later, before 
~ UN Human Rights Commission. It could influence other 
countries, the Scandinavian countries, Francoprone 
countries and countries in Latin America." 
Aexx>rtlin:J to Horta, some ASEAN countries are getting 
tired of having to support lnebnesia every time joint 
AS EA N and EEC events take place arrl t:te Portuguese raise 
East Timer. ASEAN countries have always supported 
Incbresia at t:te UN but some, such as Thailand which has 
had a close friendship with Portugal for many years, 
might now oonsider changing their position. * 
EASTTIMOR 
A West Papuan group performing during a Human Rights 
Seminar in Dusseldorf, when EEC-ASEAN foreign ministers 
were meeting there. East Timorese representative, 
Cristiano Costa is seated in the background. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The latent danger of the PKI 
It has becane a ritual for Indonesian generals to warn 
people of 'bahaya laten PKI', the 'latent danger of the 
PKI' (the banned Indonesian Communist Party), as an 
ever-present threat. Among the younger generation who 
did not experience the 1965/66 massacres and mass 
arrests, mudl of this talk goes in one ear and out of 
the otter. For them, the PK I does not exist and, however 
much the generals may go on, there have never been any 
signs of a PKI revival. For young lncbnesians interested 
in human rights, and social and environmental issues, 
the PKI spectre is just a part of history. 
The anti-oommunistover-kill of retired generals like 
sarwo Edrl.e arrl Amir Mahmud oometirnes worries the more 
seruricy-c<JlSc.ious gerErals who see it as being counter-
prcxluctive, because it makes people more eager to learn 
about the 'forbidden fruit' of Marxism. 
The latest 'bahaya laten' campaign has brought to 
light splits among the generals, each with their own 
analysis of the present political sitllation. A glance at 
the dispute gives some idea of the present political 
atmosphere in Jakarta. 
General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo 
Ten days after the inauguration of the new cabinet. 
retired General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo startled everyone by 
resigning from the DPR and MPR, the two legislative 
assemblies, and giving an interview to Jayakarta, a 
Jakarta daily, which was published under the sensational 
headline: "Pecple smelling of PKJ-Madiun should not 
occupy key posts". No names were mentioned but anyone 
who krows anything about Indonesian politics oould tell 
thatSarwo Edhie was talking about the Vioe-Presirent. 
General Sudharrnooo. It was in Madiun in 1948 that the 
army swocped ebwn on the PKI and other leftwing 
organisations, blaming them for an alleged attempt to 
take over the government. At the time of Sudharrnono's 
appointment, stories circulated about his early leftwing 
leanings, including membership of the PKI's youth 
organisation, Pesindo, ~ne of the organisations 
clobbered in Madiun. Since 1965, thousands have lost 
their lives because of alleged 'Madiun involvement'. 
Many staunch New Order supporters greeted the 
app:>intment of &ldhmnan arrl some otrer cabinet mem hers 
with dismay. Even wrenheentered the army's law academy 
in the 1950s, he was still known as a 'leftist'. Several 
of his proteges now in the cabinet have similar 
reputations. The new Attorney-GerEral, Sukarton 
Marmosudjono, was a member of the leftist wing of PNI, 
the nationalist party, known as the PNl-Asu. 
Fora New Order hawk like Sarwo Edhie, this was more 
than he could stomach. As a young colonel in charge of 
the red-beretmuroer !:qllads in 1965, he spearheaded the 
reddrive in many PKI strrngholds, slaughtering hundreds 
of thousands of commwti.st sympathisers. Some say that 
even his own father fell victim to the butchering, while 
his son would not raise a finger to protect him. With 
such a background, the 'bahaya laten' rib.la! is de.:ir to 
Sarwo Edhie's heart. 
Althrugh he helped install Suharto as president. Sarwo 
Edhienever becarnepartof Suharto's inner core. He had 
none of the subtleties of 'intel' officers. Smashing 
heads was the l"\flly language this rather simple-minded 
officer could understarrl. After serving as ambassador 
for a while, he was recalled to run BP?, the 
indoctrination outfit responsible for compulsory 
Pancasila courses. But here too, he failed to employ the 
cunning skills in which Suharto has become so adept. 
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In Sarwo Edlie's opinion, a Pancasila human being is 
superior to anything on earth so the idea that 
comnnmi.sts or prostitutes could win a highly-treasured 
P4 certificate was obscene. Yet anyone can learn the 
stuff by rote, so our upright general was horrified to 
discover thatformer communists had passed with flying 
colours. still worse, stories began to abound about 
prostitutes framing their certificates and displaying 
them on their walls. This led him to denounce the very 
idea that such pecple could be brainwashed. In ro doing, 
he destroyed the roncept of Pancasila education as a 
force to transform the whole pcpulation. Hence, it was 
decided that Sarwo Edhie should be found another job. 
Wren he was app::rlnteda memberofthe DPR and the MPR, 
it was th:>ught that, as one of the crowd, he would have 
less chance to cause embarrassments. He has the 
reputation of being a pure warrior type, not interested 
in material wealth, an oddball among the ge~rals, 
satisfied to live with his family in a humble house in 
the compound of the red-beret barracks. But he really 
set a precedent this time because no appointed member 
had ever resi~ from the legislature before. Some 
thought he objected to being a back-bencher, below 
officers junior to him who were given positions of 
leadership in parliament. But the Jayakarta interview 
gives a better idea of the reason for his 
disenchantment. 
But his version c£. 'bahaya laten' was really going too 
far. Here was someone using the ritual to attack leading 
membersof~ernrnent. So.itfell to Admiral Sudomo, now 
Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs 
to come out with a rebuttal. He angrily denounced the 
ins:imlation that an '-ex-PKier' could have reached the 
top. But a few days later, Jayakarta was at it again. 
This time, retired General Nichlany, a former deputy-
chief of Bakin, the intelligence coordination agency, 
complaining that "several key government posts are 
unstable (rawan)". He said that after two failed 
attempts at insurrection, the PKI was now trying to 
infiltrate the bureaucracy and occupy strategic 
positions. This interview was followed by four articles 
wamingofthedangersofcommunism. Clearly, the paper 
was serving the interests of a group of disgruntled, 
retired generals. 
The West SUrnatra events 
In the midst of all this kerfuffle came the 
sensational news that the chairman of Golkar in 
Payakumbuh had been dismissed because of "clear 
indications of PKI involvement:!', adding fuel to the 
Sarwo and Nichlany charges. Then, several newspapers 
reported that two e>H:apols in the same part of the 
country had applied for permission to set up a political 
party for ex-prisoners. It is hard to conceive that this 
was a serious proposal. Ex-tapols are under ronstant 
surveillance and are unlikely to come up with such a 
provocative idea. It is far more likely that the two e.x-
tapols - if indeed they really exist - had been put up 
to it by officials to create a stir about a 'PKI 
comeback'. The two events grabbed the headlines for 
days, renewing interest in the 'bahaya laten' scare. 
SUhardiman's spider-web theo:ry 
Not to be left out, the ooxt contributor to the debate 
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was retired General Suhardiman, chairman of Soksi., the 
yellow union set up in pre-1965 days to fight the 
leftwing union, Sobsi. He was a founding member of 
Golkar woo, like Sarwo Edhie, helped bring Suharto to 
po\fer but has always been kept out of his inner core. 
Until Sudharmono took over the leadership of Golkar in 
1983, Suhardiman was one of its leading lights and 
played a key role in Golkar's parliamentary fraction. 
After Golkar was tu~ from a federation intX> a fully-
fledged party with a vertical structure, Suhardiman's 
role was diminished. He was elbowed out and lost his 
seat in the legislature in the last elections. 
According to Suhardiman who prefers to dabble in 
certainties, the PK! will re-emerge in 1995. Three 
concepts of the Suharto government, the 'bahaya laten' 
concept, the 'clean (political) environment' concept, 
and the concept of 'alertness' (kewaspadaan), have 
forced the PK! to switch their strategy and tactics. He 
says that communists judge things not in terms of 
wi.nn:iJlg or lcsing but of success or failure. When one 
strategy fails, another must be devised. In Indonesia 
today, the workers and peasants have become a 'floating 
mass' ro they are no longer fertile ground for political 
action. Hence the communists have tu~d to the 
bureaucracy. It is a scphisticated game, played strictly 
according to the rules, and they could, he warns, be 
effective. He compares them to a spider, building its 
web slowly and carefully. Or, he says, look at a sweet 
potato. Above groorrl, .it looks attractive but down below 
the roots are pushing in all directions. 
This ti.me round, the 'bahaya laten' warnings have been 
brushed aside by those in authority. Besides Sudomo, 
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General Murdani and several Golkar spokespeople have 
entered the fray. Murdani has insisted that "as far as I 
krow, as Kopkamtib canmander, no important positions in 
C}JITemmert:areladbyPKiorex--PKI members". A Golkar 
spokesman, Marzuki D arusman urged the public not to 
exaggerate the dangers of communism for this oould only 
make people restive. Colonel Nurhadi, head of the 
Information Division of Kopkamtih, gave public 
assurances that all prop le in high positions have passed 
a clearance test, while admitting that these tests are 
not infallible. But Sudomo went farther, saying that 
there must be an ulterior motive behind the scare-
mongering, "to disrupt unicy and create an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and fear''. 
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Of course, the dispute brings no relief to the 
lrurrlreds of thrusarrls of alleged PKI sympathisers. After 
more than two decades of persecution, they are still 
treated like pariahs, as Mahbub Djunaedi reveals in his 
moving article publish:rl elsewhere in this issue. The 
latest 'bahaya laten' scare only draws attention to a 
new groupofdisgruntledofficers, unhappy with a number 
of Slhart:o's appointments. But, however sound their New 
Order credentials may be, they hardly have the power to 
make any dents in the Suharto armoury. * 
A fell ow Indonesian 
The following article, reproduced here in full, was written by Mahbub Djunaedi, a well-known columnist and member of the 
Muslim party, Nahdatul Ulama. It appeared in Kompas, on 8 May 1988. 
He's now 64 years old. Back in 1965, he was a civil 
servant in quite a senior post and had been in the 
service for twency-one years. At the time of the 
political events of that year, he went on working as 
usual, witrout anything happening. 
Suddenly in March 1966 he was dishonorably dismissed 
as fran 1 January 1966. He had received no advance 
warning that this would happen. He hadn't been 
suspended, mr screened, mr interrcXJated by anyone. The 
dismissal came like a bolt out of the blue. 
. KA RTU TANDA PENDUDUK 
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His head of department felt so sorry for him that he 
advised him to romplain to the central authorities. So 
he sent letters, asking for his case to be considered. 
He wrote to the oommander of Kopkamtib (Operational 
Command for the Restoratiai of Security and Order), to 
the leadershlp of Parliament, to V.B. da Costa, chairman 
of Parliament's Commission m and to Sabam Sirait, 
chairman of its Commission II. In his letters, he asked 
for an investigation to find out why he had been 
dismissed. Along with the letters, he sent statements 
from the local leaders of the PNI (the naticnalist 
party) and the NU (the main Muslim party), testifying 
that he was clean. 
From then on, things went well. He voted at the 1971 
and 1977 general elections and no attempt was made to 
disqualify him. Superficially things seemed to be 
alright although he never received replies to any of his 
letters. 
But then, in 1981, altrough he had heard nothing about 
any charges, he received a cruel shock, a letter from 
the Kopkamtih executive officer in Central Java saying 
that he had been classified as BL He didn't even 
understand what B 1 classification meant. As before, he 
was nct:.sunmaiedor investigated by anyone. He began to 
wonder whether this decision had been taken simply 
because he had written those letters. Had things got 
worse for him because of the letters? 
Feeling desperate and at a loss to kmw what to do, he 
decided to leave things to the Almighty and to accept 
whatever difficulties might befall him even though he 
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had no idea whathe had done wrong. Having already done 
everything possible, what else could he cb buts urrerrler 
to fate and bow to the inevitable? If the rock looming 
ahead was so oolossal and his hams too weak to shift 
it what else oould re do but sit back and hope that God 
and those in power would take pity on him? 
* * * 
But then what happened? He was not going to be allowed 
to live in peace. The waters that had been stilled began 
to swirl around him again. Why? He read an item of news 
on page XI of Kompas, on 3 February this year. He was 
still to be haunted by allKi.ecy. The newspaper reported 
that the West Java Education and Culture Office was 
conducting clearance tests for all elementary school 
teachers in the region. Everyone affected by the 
screening had to buy three oopies of thE? screening book 
oosting Rp. 1,250 each and twelve 3-by-4 passport 
photos. This was the seoorrl time tests were being 
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conducted; the first time was in 197 2. 
What was it for this time? To make sure that there was 
a "clean enviralmene• in the world of education. And 
what did "clean environment:!' mean? It meant that no 
educators sh::md have grarrlp:rrents or parents-in-law who 
had been involved in OT (banned organisations). All 
edu::at:ors must be as clean as an unblemished piece of 
white cloth. A screening team at the Education and 
Culture Office was collecting data on 190,000 teachers 
and 5,000 people on the administrative staff. 
Why did he get so upset? Because he has five children 
who are all civil servants; one graduated from a 
teachers' training collage (IKIP) and teaches at an 
elementary school. He felt distraught because his 
children would be hit by this "clean environment" 
criterion, even though the oldest was only in the third 
furm cf. lower seccndary scnx>l and the youngest was only 
four years old in 1%5. How could a third-form youngster 
or a four-year-old child understand anything about 
ideology and politics? But if they were linked to their 
father who had been dismissed and classified as B 1, 
there was every likeli.hJod they would be swept away by 
the clean-up. 
He had no idea what to do. He could only resign 
himself. He did not want his blameless children to be 
hit by the law for things beyond their control. Why had 
they been allowed to grow up if only to be cut oown in 
the end? 
What is the name of the fellow I have been talking 
about? His name isn't important. And anyway, he ck>esn't 
want anyone to mention it in public. It's enough if 
people kmw that there is a 64-year-old Indonesian who 
is suffering such a fate in a country that is based on 
the Pancasila. l} 
Mahbub D junaidi 
Prailloedya: ''This is a bandit reginte'' 
Irrl:n:!sia's best-known writer and Nobel Prize candidate, 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, recently told Dutch journalis~ 
Hans Hoffmann, that he would never leave Inoonesia 
because it would be much easier for his fellow-
countrymen to terrorise him abroad than in Indonesia. 
Asked whether he would be allowed to travel to the 
Netherlands, Pram said: "I probably would, but I would 
probably not be able to retllrn. This regime is a bandit 
regime. They have murdered half a million people. They 
are prepared to do absolutely anything. I myself saw 
people in Buru being shot dead. Without trial. The 
regime is respmsible for what happens here, but not 
abroad. The world press would write about it if anything 
happened to me. I have an internaticnal name." 
He spoke at length about his arrest in 1965 and his 
fourteen years indetenticn without trial. Asked whether 
he was a romrnunis~ Pram said that he came from a left 
nationalist family. "Since my childlxxxi days, my 
upbringing was left oriented." 
"1965 was the break in my life. My life is divided 
into the period before 1965 and the period since 1965. 
That was when I was arrested but to this very day, I 
still don't know why. My house was seized. That happened 
on 13 Ootober. I had about five thousand books and they 
were all burnt. I was taken to a prison in Jakarta. 
"I was married and had eight children. My wife had to 
feed the children on her own. She had almcst no morey. 
On top of looking after the children, she had to buy 
food for me because the food in pris:m was so 
inadequate. I remained in prisai for fourteen years and 
two months." 
After spmding some years in Jakarta, Pram was moved 
to the notorious prison island of Buru. For the first 
eight years he was oot allowed to write, but he said 
that was not his worst problem. 
A book about Buro. to appear S(X)n 
"I come from a family of fighters, but row I was a 
pariah. I could no longer contribute to the national 
struggle. Why did the New Omer of Suharto do this to 
me? I began to porrler aboot everything. And then to 
write, when I was again able to. My book about Buru will 
probably rome out in Ma~h and it will first appear in 
the Netherlands. I will tell you why it took so lcng. 
When I read The Gulag Archipelag::> by Solzhenitsin, it 
struck me that my book was a kind of ropy of his. My 
story was vecy much like hi.s, so I th>ught it better to 
wait. Now the time has come. I haven't change the 
manuscript one single jot." 
Asked whether he had anything more to say, Pram 
repLJed: ''I have much more to say. Too mu::h. That's why 
I write. I am very grateful to the Dutch people for 
reading my books Ttey.havehelp:?dsaved me from beroming 
an outcast. I am very grateful." 
Pramoedya has w r:itten about b'1 enty books but they are 
all banned in Indonesia, including the translations into 
Dutch. He lives from the royalties for his books that 
have been published overseas. In the past few years, 
frurteen translations have app:?ared: "Japanese, Chinese, 
Turkish, Swedish, Dutch, French, German, English, Czech, 
Bulgarian. Russian, Roumanian. Is that fourteen?" 
Asked why his books were banned in Indonesia, he 
replied: "That is their problem, not mine. It- is more 
difficult to write than to destroy. You can destroy 
things in five minutes, whereas literature makes people 
conscious." 
20 TAPOL Bulletin No. 87, June 1988 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A glinipse into Indonesia's torture challlbers 
A Muslim activist who must remained anonymous wrote an account of his experiences as a detainee in Jakarta after the army 
shot at a Muslim demonstration in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, killing dozens of people. The writer was one .of many 
dozens of Muslims who were rounded up in the immediate aftermath of the Tanjung Priok massacre. 
The following is an abridged translation of his account. The full report was published in March 1988 by Huslimedia, 
London, under the title: "Untold tale of ghastly torture in Indonesia." 
As soon as we arrived at the North Jakarta military 
command detention centre in the middle of the night, our 
harrls were tied up w:ithrqie and oor faces were wrapped 
in thick, dark cloth, with the ends tied round the neck 
so that we could not see anything in front, to the left 
or right, or behind. We could rear friends in the same 
room being called a way and taken to other rooms by the 
soldiers on guard. 
Then we heard beat:.in:Js and screams of pain; they were 
being beaten about the face, on the legs and in all 
parts of the body with clubs. The soldiers forbade us to 
say 'Allahu Akbar' (though of course we said the words 
even if they would have killed us for it). When we said 
'Lailaha Illallah' or 'Allahu Akbar', they flew into a 
rage. They stocx:l in froot of us, kicking us in the face 
with their heavy boots, taunting us, and saying: "Here 
is your Allah". Nauzubillahi min zalik. 
With our faces all swollen and bleeding, they pulled 
our clothes off, leaving us in our underpants. We could 
not resist as our hands and faces were bound up tight. 
As they were stripping us, they struck our heads with 
rifle butts, making us bleed. Then we were told to go to 
sleep on the floor, on our backs, with our faces 
bleeding and still wrap~d up. Then they trampled on our 
faces, screaming: "You devils, you PKI [Indonesian 
Commun:istParcy) airi:f'. We were treated like animals for 
the whole night, from about 2 am till 6 am. 
The next morning the soldiers on duty were replaced. 
we prayed that the new guards would treat us better as 
we could stand no more. But these were forlom hopes. 
The rew batch of soldiers were under the command of 
Captain Rencano, a Menadonese Christian from North 
Sulawesi. Soon after taking over, they yelled: "Hey, 
have you eaten?" At first we didn't want to reply but 
they kept yelling, striking us in the face with clubs. 
Our heads started bleeding again and several friends 
fainted. One friend, Surya bin M. Isa, was kicked in the 
mouth as the soldier yelled, "Here's my foot to eat 
instead of a plate of rice". The friend's mouth was cut 
open and began to bleed. When another friend said re had 
eaten, the soldier barked back: "You're lying", grabbed 
his head and banged it against the wall so hard that it 
started bleeding. The friend fainted. 
By row it was 12 nocn on Wednesday, 13 September. It 
was extremely hot in the sun because we were almost 
naked and we were hungry and thirsty. We all had 
splitting headaches and felt sick. Some friends became 
so desparate they thought of trying to escape but this 
would have been impossible because we were blindfolded 
with our hands tied beh.i.rrl our backs .•.• 
Whm the sun was at its highest, at about 1 pm, some 
forcy of us were told to crawl sideways like frogs, in a 
sitting positicn, out to a concrete forecourt which was 
burning hot in the sun. We had to lie on the concrete 
with nothing oovering our bodies. They kicked us and 
struck us with treir rifle butts. We had to go to sleep 
out there, repeating the words, "Allahu Akbar". At first 
it felt as if there was a soorching ot iron on our 
backs. We tried to withstarrl this terrible agcny. Some 
frierrls fainted. Many were screaming with pain, twisting 
their bodies left:. or righ~ like fish being roasted on a 
---. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
Published by: T APOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy 
tenns of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, 
conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or 
journals that denOlmce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing 
incidents that were never properly investigated. 
The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 
1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed 
crowd. The trials took place a1 a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military 
government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from 
proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime. 
'The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state 
that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing W estem norms 
and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers 
is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. ~thoug~ it focuses on. events in 
Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently 
lUlStable and are invariably held together by oppression.'" 
Dr. M. Gbayasuddln, Editor, ;\iuslimedia 
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spit. 
This went on for three days. 
In the Lion's Den 
Guntur, the headquarters of the military police (PM) 
in Rumput Market., South Jakarta, is notfar from Pondok 
As-syafi-iah. It has beoome known as the Lion's Den 
because criminals or political prisoners taken there 
face three alternatives: they go mad, become paralysed 
or die. 
After three days of torture, we were transferred to 
this, the most feared place of all. We travelled in a 
covered milit.ary truck, blindfolded with our hands tied. 
When we arrived, our tormentors pushed us off the truck 
so that we fell to the ground, with our hands and eyes 
tightly bound. The troops welcomed us with blows and 
kicks. We were tren forced to crawl aboot 150 metres to 
the rear. Some of us could not crawl fast enough so the 
troops got on our backs and beat us with canes and 
stingray fish-tails and gave us electric shocks. One 
frierrl was even stripped naked arrl given an electric 
snxk on his penis. His whole body quivered with pain as 
he let out a piercing shriek. Many of us became 
paralysed by this treatment. 
When we entered the rear of the building, we heard 
shrieks of pain coming from the cells. We heard some 
people sobbing quietly, as if trying to stifle their 
sobs. Sometimes the sobbing would stop then start up 
again. These were other friends who had arrived here 
earlier. What they had gone through was far worse than 
anything we had yet experienced. 
We were put into a large room with a heavy door of 
iron bars. It was now about 5 pm on 16 September. After 
a while, the torturers called five of us. The men were 
asked whether they had had a bath. "Not yet.," they 
replied, so the soldiers shouted back; "Okay, go and 
have a bath!" The friends did what they were told. we 
were rel.ie11ed to hear this because we had not been able 
to wash for fcur days. We were itching all over and our 
bcxlies smelt dreadfully from sweat and dried-up blood. 
But when the five friends reblrned, we were aware of a 
terrible stench. They had not had a bath at all but had 
been forced to immerse themselves in a stinking drain 
full of filth that had been stagnating for years. They 
took us out in graips of five, until everyone had been 
thraigh the same terrible experience. 
After magrib (evening prayers), the cloths wrapperl 
round our faces were removed and we were given some 
food, a few spoonfuls of rice and some under-cooked 
salt-fish. But we ate ravenously because we had had 
nothing to eat or drink since early morning. But some 
friends were unable to eat because their throats had 
swollen from the all beating. A few oours later, we 
began to itch arrl spots appeared all over our bodies. 
None of us could sleep all night because of the itching. 
And because we scratched the spots, they turned into 
soars. This itching lasted for about a mcnth and only 
improverl after we were moved to Cimanggis Prison and 
were treated for the soars. 
Two days after arriving at the Lion's Den. we again 
heard shrieks coming from a comer cell . A man was 
sobbing intermittently, sometimes loudly, sometimes 
softly, and sometimes his voice altogether disappeared. 
Later, after moving to C imanggis, we discOll'ered that he 
was a friend called Lilik, from Gang W arakas, Tanjung 
Priok, not more than twenty. He was crying because his 
harrls had been tied behind his back for six days; the 
fingers of his right hand were bo\Dld so tight with a 
piece of wire that the blood could not circulate. His 
hand had swollen up arrl was rotting away. When we met 
him in Cimanggis, only the bones of the fingers were 
left. The flesh had all rotted and fallen off, bit by 
bit. Later he had all the fingers of his right hand 
amputated. Lilik was suspected of being a supporter of 
Amir Bild [a Muslim leader who was shot dead on 12 
September in Tanjung Priok]. 
Laksus, Jakarta Special Military Unit 
Laksus, the headquarters of Jakarta military command 
intelligence, is located in Salemba Tengah, not far from 
Salemba Prison. It is often called Gua Hantu or 'Cave of 
Ghosts' because it is so terrifying. 
Anyone being transferred he.re goes into a panic at the 
thought of what is about to happen. Many who arrive fit 
and well are carried out on a burial-stretcher. A recent 
example is Pak Jabir, an official of a mos:iue in Tanjung 
Priok, who was accused of being an accomplice of Ir. 
Sarvesi, a former minister of industry, in plans for an 
Islamic revolution in Indcnesia and the overthrow of the 
dictator, President Suharto. Pressure was u~d to force 
him to ccnfess that Ir. Sanoesi was the key figure in 
the movement. But Pak Jabir, a Buginese, a man of great 
faith, refused to confess. They pulled out his nails one 
by one. When this failed, these evil men stuck an iron 
rod cbwn his throat. Pak Jabir died a martyr. His body 
was returned to his family in Tanjung Priok. 
Other ghastly incidents occurred, such as the torture 
of Robi Pantau, a young Muslim accused of urrlermining 
~authority of President Suharto. He is now serving a 
fifteen-year sentence in Cipinang Prison. His hands and 
feet were tied when he was brought to Laksus. When the 
truck arrived, he was thrown on to the ground which was 
covered in grit. Because of the way he fell, he became 
deaf in one ear. Then there is Asrul Arifin row serving 
. , 
a sixteen-year sentence in Cipinang. While in Laksus, 
A shot token during the session of the trial of Muslim 
activist, HM. Fatwa. When he was presenting his defence 
plea, hearings went on late into the night. 
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table-legs were placed on his feet with four soldier-
torblrers sitting on the table. This almost broke his 
toes. 
We had been transferred to the 'Cave of Ghosts after 
four days in Guntur, from 16 to 20 September 1984. On 
the way, we surrendered ourselves to Allah. Even so, 
many friends came out in a cold sweat on the journay, 
thinking of what was about to happen. On arrival, we 
were greeted with blows by the soldier-guards. Our 
faces, already swollen and bloody from earlier 
treatmen~ became even more swollen; we looked like 
moldy black papayas covered with red blotches. we got 
the same treatment every time we were interrogated. 
Sometimes they used electric shock to make us cmfess. 
This was cur treatment for two days. On 21 September. we 
were again transferred to Cimanggis Prison. 
Cimanggis Military Prison 
This military prison is the most modern prison in 
Indcnesia, with loud-speakers and television cameras 
outside to cmtrol the movements of the priscners. It is 
in Bogor distric~ about 25 kms from the Cililitan bus 
term:inus. The priscn is surrounded by seven perimetres, 
making it impossible for anyme to escape. The first is 
a barbed-wire fence, the seoond a series of posts for 
soldiers who are ecpert marskmen. The third is dominated 
by two sentry pests guarded by heavily-armed troops. The 
fourth is another barbed-wire fence along which nms an 
electrified cable. The fifth is a long ircn fence with 
sharp spikes. The sixth is a heavy wooden gate in frcnt 
of which there .is a television camera which is visible 
from afar. The seventh is a heavy iron gate. 
We were detained here for many months. While in this 
prison, we hardly ever saw the sun or heard any news. 
But we never forcpt the name of Allah, and we prayed 
nightanddayexceptwhen we were absolutely exhausted. 
It was here that we learnt to ccpe with hunger. Each day 
we received only two spoonfuls of rice, cne at 12 noon 
and one at 5 pm, just to keep us from dying. It is hard 
to describe the effects of starvation. Mcst days, our 
limbsan:lbodywa.ll.dtremble because we were weak from 
hunger. Sometimes we fell into a daze, everything going 
black before our eyes, unable to see anything clearly, 
unable to stand up. At such times it was extremely 
difficult to pray because we could not kneel. Even to 
move the body was a huge effort. Many friends became 
paralysed and could not pray at all, except by blinking 
their eyes. 
Still worse were the ~eriences of friends who had 
been shot during the Tanjung P riok affair. They were not 
given proper medical treatment. Yusran bin Jainari had a 
serious heart condition because one of the bullets that 
had penetrated his chest was still lodged in his body, 
!* .~ 
US writers award for Pramoedya 
The American Centre of PEN, the international 
writers' organisation, has given one of its highest 
lnloors, the Freabm to Write award, to the renowned 
Indonesian writer, Pramoedya Ananta Teer, all of 
wmsebcoksarebannErlin his own country. The award 
ceremrny took place on 27 April but Pram was not 
able to be present. [Washington Post, 24 April 1988] 
Needless to say, this outstanding award to an 
Indonesian writer was not so much as mentioned in 
the Indcnesian press. 
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close to his heart. Maqsudi had been shot in the back 
and the bullet was still looged near his kidooy; he was 
not treated for a year. Yet even so, he was forced to 
appear at one of the regime's show-trials. He was later 
treated by Muslim cloct:ors at the Islamic Hospital in 
Jakarta. They nursed him back to health though he did 
not fully recover. Another victim was Ismail bin Abdul 
Hamid who had been shot in the chest. The bullet had 
pierced through to his back. He had difficulty 
breathing because one lung had been pierced by the 
bullet. On one occasion, I thought he had passed away; 
he seemed mt to breath for a whole hour. Then, he began 
breathing again. Ismail was sentenced to a year in jail. 
After his release he was treated by doctors at the 
Islamic Hospital and has since recovered, trough two of 
his ribs have been removed. The fourth was Amir bin 
Bunari wmsearm was broken because of a bullet wound. 
For almost a month, he got no medical treatmen~ so the 
wound festered badly. He has since recCl\.Tered though he 
will never be restored to full health. 
Many dozens more suffered in this way. It is hard to 
imagine just how much they suffered. ~ 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
Muslim teenage girls sentenced 
In mid April, just before the commencement of the holy 
month of Ramadhan, several district courts in Java 
passed severe sentences on a number of alleged Muslim 
activists. 
More usroh ttials 
After several months when the trials of usroh 
activists seem to have faded away, and prosecuticns of 
NII or Indonesian Islamic State people in Jakarta and 
Jemaah Islam people in Cirebon took centre-stage, the 
usroh spectre has emerged again, this time in the 
village of K olekan Beku, K laten sub-district in Central 
Java. 
The usroh movement is an Islamic movement based on 
small, muse gatherings, promoting piecy arrl a return to 
basic Islamic values. 
On 9 April, the Klat:en district court sentenced 
thirteen teenage women to six-month sentences, with 
costs. The court judged that the thirteen young women 
were involved in a 'criminal' organisation known as 
usroh which aims to bring about the creation of a state 
based on the Qu'ran and Hadits. Most of the defendants 
were high sch:>ol graduates or first-year students. This 
is the first time that women have been prosecuted in the 
wave of Muslim trials under way since 1984. 
According to the public prosecutor's office, the girls 
were dealt with 'e>etremely leniently', having been tried 
under the Criminal Code and not the far harsher Anti.-
Subversion Law. 
Three otrer persons, referred to only by their 
initials, AM, MYH and YFH, who are said to have given 
the girls training courses, are due to be tried later 
under the more serious charge of subversion. 
The thirteen girls, Srlyanti, Tri Maonah, Nunung 
Retnoningsih, Rohayati, Suwarti, Sri S~ati, Sri 
Hartati, Nurhidayati, Dwi Wasi, Murtilaksminingsarl, 
Si.ti.Mu:pnah, Nw:hidayah Eroang Niswati and Mela Pratiwi 
were found guilty of attending "illegal religious 
gatherings" (pengajiangelap) between 23 and 26 NOV'ember 
1987, in a muse in the village of Kolekan Beku. During 
these meetings, the government, the judiciary and the 
Majelis Ulama Wonesia (Ulamas' Council ofindooesi.a) 
were all slarrlered, which led the court to conclude that 
they were subversive. 
More NII trials 
The NII trials meanwhile continued in Jakarta, though 
at a slower pace, apparently because it was Ramadhan, 
the month of fasting. 
Twoparkingatterlant:s, Aliminarrl Iskarrlar (see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 86), woo were being tried in separate 
court-rooms in the South Jakarta District Cou~ 
received heavy sentences of eight and seven years 
respectively. 
As members of a group allegedly responsible for fund-
raising for the Nil, the two were said to have carried 
cut robberies. They also attended rourses at which basic 
state tenets, such as the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution, were criticised. 
In the East Jakarta District Court, the trial of a 
roof-tile trader identified only as DAB, forty years 
old, continued. The prosecutor, Agoeng Masa, delivered 
his summing-up arrl demanded a sentence of rifteen years. 
Theaocusedis allegro tohave been a member, along with 
Syahroni (already sentenced to fifteen years), Safki 
Suarul Huda (serving a life sentence) and Aa (whose 
trial is soon to take place), of a Fa'i or furn-raising 
group to support the subversive NII movement. l} 
[Souroes: Jawa Pas 26 April, Kedaulatan Rakyat, 11 April 
and Jakarta Post, 18 April 1988.) 
Another death sentence prisoner 
dies 
Suwandi, the former secretary of the East Java 
Pro1.1inci.al Committee of the Indoresian Communist Party, 
who was sentenced to death in June 1973, has died in 
prison of a heart attack. He was 64 years old. Suwandi 
was arrested in July 1968, along with many other PK! 
leaders who had tried to create a clarrlestine PKI 
organisatirn in South Blitar, East Java. He spent almost 
twenty years in Pamekasan Prison, Madura. 
According to reliable information, Suw andi suffered a 
heart attack late last year but recovered and was 
returned to P amekasan Prison. 
In April this year, he suffered a second heart attack 
and died on 23 April. He was buried in Surabaya on 24 
April in a funeral attemed by members of his family. 
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